Obama goes for the kill
Aref Assaf
Immense popular support, coupled with wide congressional
baseline, President Obama is asserting America's national
interests in the Middle East- and he may succeed.
May 30, 2009
The emergence of
Zionist-Jewish colonialism - otherwise euphemistically called
"Israeli settlements" - as the litmus test of relations between
Israel and the United States is an important indicator of how
quickly the Obama administration has moved to reposition itself
in the Middle East.
The latest statements by
President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hilary Clinton
represent a dramatic change in American policy rhetoric, which
now unambiguously calls for a total freeze on settlements,
natural growth, "outposts" and anything else the Israelis do
when they transfer their population into colonies built on Arab
lands occupied in 1967. Washington has dropped its previous
wishy-washy practice of merely calling colonies and settlements
"unhelpful" to peacemaking, and has used dramatic moments to
press its point to Israel and the world.
The most telling was when
Obama spoke in the White House Oval Office in the presence of
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, bluntly shooting down
every Israeli attempt to shift the focus of conversation to "the
Iranian threat," and instead stressing two counter-points: that
resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict was probably a more
important priority for reducing tensions throughout the Middle
East; and that freezing settlement-building was an essential
start for progress on this front.
The freezing of modern
Zionist colonialism in occupied Arab lands is now a priority of
American foreign policy. Three significant dimensions of this
dynamic should be appreciated.
The first is the apparent
change in US policy, which now emphasizes the priority and
centrality of resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict among the
wider challenges throughout the Middle East, and includes
active, top-level American diplomatic engagement. This dramatic
change has been driven primarily by the sensible realization in
Washington that overall American interests and standing in the
region are deteriorating steadily, and American acquiescence in
Israeli colonialism and other crimes is one of several reasons
for this. When the US invoked its own national interest as the
main criterion for its policies, it quickly realized that it
needed to change those policies. This has meant becoming a more
active and impartial peace-maker, rather than remaining the
weapons supplier, apologist and protector of Israel and its
colonial ways.
The second significant
dimension of events these days is the battle of wills between
the US and Israel on the issue of freezing settlements
completely, and what this might mean for domestic politics in
both countries. Obama enjoys immense popularity and a majority
in Congress that he can rely on, and he ensures this support and
neutralizes the power of the pro-Israel lobby in Congress by
framing his policy as necessary for the US national interest.
Netanyahu, on the other hand, leads a vulnerable coalition and
does not have deep popular support in Israel. He is likely to
elicit strong criticism if he keeps widening the gap between the
US and Israel - the single most important political relationship
for Israel - and probably will be thrown out of office if this
trend continues.
The third and most
important dimension in the medium and long term is about how the
settlements issue fits into the wider demands of a
comprehensive, negotiated peace between the Palestinians and
Israelis. Freezing settlements is seen in Washington as critical
to kick-starting an Arab-Israeli negotiating process; but any
negotiations that hope to succeed will have to tackle the much
more difficult issue of the status and rights of the Palestinian
refugees. The danger is that so much political muscle and
negotiating time will be expended on achieving a settlement
freeze that prospects for getting the concessions needed on the
refugees issue will lessen significantly.
Israel's strategy is to
make it seem that its concessions on settlements are so huge
that the Palestinians have to make counter-concessions on the
refugee issue. The trade-off Israel seeks is to drop its right
to expand settlements in return for the Palestinians dropping
their demand to offer the refugees a full range of options in a
permanent peace accord, including the right of return for some
refugees to their original homes and lands in Israel today. This
is a dangerous approach because it equates Israeli settlements -
an illegal, criminal act that is widely condemned by the entire
world - with the legitimate rights of the refugees, which are
widely recognized in law and many United Nations resolutions.
The emphasis on
immediately freezing Israeli settlements is heartening, and it
is reasonable to ask the Arabs to make a reciprocal gesture of
equal magnitude on criminal activity from our side, such as
clamping down hard on terrorism against civilians. If the US
pursues a truly even-handed approach that recognizes that crimes
by Israeli and Arabs must be condemned and stopped
simultaneously, it will increase the likelihood that the rights
of both sides can then be addressed in a more credible and
fruitful manner.