Aref Assaf, 10-5-07

(See my previous commentary on this subject)

Note: A shorter version of this article appeared in the Daily Record on 10/12/2007 and another longer version appeared in the Sunday edition of the Herald News on Sunday 10/14/2007

All eyes will be on Annapolis, Maryland as it prepares to host next month's version of the defunct peace conference between Israel and the Palestinians. Curiously, the Bush administration is not returning to Camp David this time as to not unearth painful memories of the 2000 Camp David Accords, which are still vividly testifying to the failure of politicians to bring about a peaceful end to the conflict.

Against all odds, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's hope that Israelis and Palestinians should move beyond a "peace process" and agree on a "political horizon" reflects a lesson about the failure of previous peace efforts. A "political horizon" that offers hope for peace and defines it in a way acceptable to both sides would create political momentum for implementing negotiations to succeed. Without such hope, extremist minorities--Palestinians and Israelis- who oppose a two state peace--will continue to dictate the agenda, as they did in destroying the open-ended Oslo peace process. Major issues such as refugee status will be relegated as unending debates over opening or closing another military check point dominates the talks.

Israeli and Palestinian leaders have thus far proved themselves unable to agree on a clear "political horizon" that would break the logjam, notwithstanding polls showing that majorities on both sides would welcome an agreement along the lines of the Clinton parameters, the Taba agreement, and the Geneva Accords. In the run-up to President Bush's fall meeting, Prime Minister Olmert and President Abbas are still far apart on the basic issues these former plans address--Jerusalem, settlements, borders, and refugees. To show his seriousness, Abbas, for his part, has threatened to resign his presidency if the conference does not succeed. He knows too well that a failed conference will translate into a victory for Hamas, which wants nothing to do with U.S.-sponsored meetings.

It is probably unrealistic to hope that Rice can prod the leaders to agree, in the weeks before the meeting, on a substantial outline for peace that has always eluded previous efforts. My advice to our president, if he is really sincere about a successful outcome for the conference, is to announce an ambitious and unprecedented American vision of peace by defining solutions to the major final status issues and pledging determined U.S. leadership to implement this "political horizon."

This commitment will require marshalling all the necessary supportive packages, including economic, diplomatic, and security-related incentives – a matter that will inevitably require complex diplomatic wrangling well after the conference is ended. Both Olmert and Abbas would be obliged to take this decisive stand seriously. The President must push for a more comprehensive agreement eclipsing  the vague joint "declaration of interests" statement that Prime Minister Olmert is seeking. The outcome must be a complete departure from procedural concessions to substantive  compromises- all based on the already well-known two-state and land for peace formulas. There has to be a dramatic move from conceptual discussions to  enforceable and practical agreements.  .

President Bush should seek the most unequivocal, unambiguous statement possible for the advancement of Palestinian statehood. The negotiations have been stalled for so long that a broad-brush declaration will do nothing to change the status quo. However, if concrete, achievable goals are the result of this conference, there is a much greater chance the Israeli-Palestinian peace process can be rescued from its current stagnation. With increased feasibility for Palestinian statehood comes a boost for moderate Arab governments in the region.

Arguably, the next few weeks  may be just as pivotal as the meeting in November. The message has to be clear: a real plan will be not only be worked out at the summit, but the U.S. will also vigorously pursue fulfillment of its recommendations afterwards. Such an objective can be achieved only if the US forgoes its unilateralist inclinations and proactively engage other powers. By so doing, the United States can inject much needed good will and enthusiasm and ensure positive Arab and international participation into the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. With a successful conference and a definable path to Palestinian statehood, perhaps the U.S. can regain some of its tarnished moral authority.

Until and unless the U.S. views a just and comprehensive peace in the  troubled Middle East as a strategic interest , peace between Arab and Israel will remain an elusive goal. If viewed as such, the U.S. may have to resort to yield considerable pressure on the Palestinians and the Israelis. Considering the weakness of both Abbas and Olmert, the U.S. stand to forge a new and dramatic chapter.

The November conference must succeed. The Palestinians and the Israelis deserve no less. President Bush's legacy will be forever tarnished absent any such dramatic and history-changing stand.

Aref Assaf, PhD, is president of American Arab Forum, a think tank based in Paterson, NJ

 

Read the official text of President Bush's speech announcing the Conference

Click here to a read a Palestinian's 'Open Letter" to Secretary Rice

Click here to read  recommendations to Secretary Rice from former U.S. Diplomats.